former generation amongst men of science. Sixty-six years ago he accompanied the expedition in search of the North-West Passage, which was commanded by Sir John Ross, as astronomer; and, from that time until advanced age brought his labours to a close, he was a keen observer and able writer on terrestrial magnetism in all parts of the world, as well as other branches of natural science. He visited New Zealand in 1842, when attached to the expedition of the “Erebus” and the “Terror” into the Antarctic regions. His name deserves to be held in special honour by colonists as the originator of the establishment of colonial observatories; one of the most important results of which has been his discovery of the relation between magnetic perturbations and the spotted condition of the sun's surface.

In Isaac Todhunter the world has lost a man remarkable no less for the keenness of his intellect, the breadth of his learning, and the profoundness of his research, than for his simple-minded humility and earnestness of purpose. Not only was he one of the most brilliant mathematicians of his day at Cambridge, but also master of many of the languages of modern Europe, including Russian; at the London University he had carried off prizes for-Greek Testament and Hebrew; throughout his life he was an earnest student of Biblical literature, and of most of the branches of theology. Born in poverty, and early thrown upon his own resources, he has left behind him a noble example of what may be achieved by talent aided only by indomitable energy.

Although Sir Charles Siemens was by birth and education a German, yet so much of his long and useful life had been spent in England, that he may fairly be claimed by the land of his adoption. At an early age he turned his attention to the investigation of matters connected with electricity; the cables which have bound all parts of the world together are to a great extent the result of the labours of him and his talented brother Werner; and he lived to see his efforts in one—as in many other departments of science—crowned with success by the opening of an electric tramway in the North of Ireland last year. At the time of his death he was engaged on a work which may, I hope, be carried on by others, and confer a lasting benefit on many millions—the abatement of smoke-fogs in large cities. I regret that time will not allow of my doing more than making a passing allusion to this great and celebrated man.

During the past year I have visited many of the fine harbours of New Zealand and some of its most interesting districts, but all parts of the colony have been so frequently described by former travellers, that

I do not propose now to give any general account of what I have seen during my journeying. As, however, one of the objects of this Institute is to take note of anything that may be of permanent importance to this country, I think it will not be out of place this evening if, as one result of my tours by sea and land, I make some remarks on the protection of the principal ports of the colony, and on the general defence of New Zealand. Of course, however, it will not be possible for me, in the course of an evening's address, to do more than give a general view of the principal points of the question.

The defence of New Zealand should be regarded from an Imperial and an Australasian, as well as from a local point of view.

The first line of defence of this, as of every other part of the British Empire, is on the lines of maritime communication. If the steamers and sailing-vessels that carry our exports and imports to and fro along the ocean highways were liable to be captured or destroyed by hostile ships, our commerce would be stopped. The result to the colonies would be disastrous. To Great Britain, it would be starvation.

The commerce of New Zealand alone is upwards of fifteen millions sterling per annum, whilst that of Australasia amounts to upwards of one hundred millions, about equal to that of the whole of South America and Mexico combined.

Naval squadrons are maintained by Great Britain in the British Channel, in the Mediterranean, in the North American and West Indian Command, in the Pacific, in China, on the East Indian Station, at the Cape of Good Hope, and last, not least, in Australasia. These are charged with the defence of British interests and of the lines of British commerce throughout the world, and in case of war would be largely supplemented by ships of the mercantile marine which are capable of carrying guns, and are otherwise adapted for warfare.

Bases for the naval defence of the empire are maintained and fortified by Great Britain, not only at Portsmouth, Plymouth, Chatham, Sheerness, Pembroke, Portland, Cork, and other places in the United Kingdom, but also at numerous places throughout the world, in positions advantageous for coaling, victualling, and refitting the vessels of war charged with the defence of our commerce.

Along the line from England to New Zealand by the Cape of Good Hope are the Islands of Ascension and St. Helena; at the Cape, Table Bay and Simon's Bay. On the route by the Suez Canal are Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Perim, and Ceylon; then going between

Ceylon and Australasia, viâ Torres Strait, is Singapore. Proceeding by the westward route, a ship passes Ascension and the Falkland Islands; or, if, when the canal is completed, by the Panama route, Bermuda, Jamaica, and the Islands of Fiji.

It is a matter of interest to observe that in most of the British possessions, as in Australia and New Zealand, there is a local supply of coal available for marine and naval purposes.

Turning now to the map of the world before you, you will see how intimately Australia and New Zealand, in common with all parts of the empire, are concerned in the defence of British naval stations and in the efficiency of the squadrons which operate therefrom. You will also understand that it is of paramount importance that these stations should be rendered thoroughly secure. They cannot fulfil the conditions required of them if their anchorages, and the depôts and repairing establishments they contain, are not protected against hostile occupation, capture, or destruction, during the absence of the squadrons they are intended to support. It is, I know, often said that the defence of these stations should be dependent upon our fleet, but this view will not bear examination. The depôts are provided to enable our vessels of war to command the sea, and those vessels cannot possess the freedom of action which is necessary for the performance of their duties if they are either tied down to particular places, or are obliged to manœuvre with a view to the protection of those places. The Admiral on a station requires his ships for the defence of our commerce at sea, and he cannot detach them for the purpose of guarding particular ports. If our naval squadrons be employed in defending their depôts, we should (as I have often pointed out) be using the fleet to maintain the depôts, instead of the depôts to maintain the fleet. Our naval depôts, therefore, should be rendered secure in themselves and independent of the action of the fleet. They must be fortified and garrisoned. If so defended, we are enabled to hold them absolutely for the use of ourselves and our allies; and our war cruisers thus supported, and acting along the maritime routes of our commerce, can afford effective protection to that commerce. If unfortified, the depôts would during the absence of our squadrons be as much the property of the enemy as of ourselves, and would supply to hostile vessels the means of attacking our commerce.

Remember the case of the “Alabama.” You well know what losses the mercantile marine of the Northern States suffered during the civil war in America, from the “Alabama” and other ships of that class cruising about on the tracks of commerce, and capturing and burning merchant vessels carrying the United States flag. You

also know—from the account of his adventures, published by Captain Semmes, who commanded the “Alabama”—that it was owing to the want of vigilance of the United States naval authorities, and to their neglecting to place men-of-war cruisers in proper positions, that he was able for a considerable period to carry on his attacks unmolested. We further know that the “Alabama” at length became unserviceable from constant cruising; and in a disabled state, not being allowed to go into dock in any port to refit, she was sunk by the “Kearsage” in an encounter with that vessel, which she was not in a condition to avoid. Had the “Alabama” been able to refit and place herself in an efficient state, she might, perhaps, have defeated the “Kearsage” and commenced a fresh career against United States commerce. We learn from this case of the “Alabama”—if indeed the conclusion were not obvious without the lesson—the absolute necessity for ensuring to ourselves, by effective defence, the use of our naval stations throughout the world, in order that they may be denied to an enemy, and that he may thus be unable to keep the sea, at the same time that they provide secure bases for the movements of cruisers engaged in the defence of our commerce. It has been said that the success of the “Alabama” in attacking the commerce of the United States was due to her being able to coal in British ports; and that hostile vessels would be unable to make an attack on Australasia because of there being no means of coaling en route. The answer to this is that coaling stations exist in the Pacific Islands; but, even were there none, the improvements in the construction of steamers during recent years have been such that vessels can now steam 28,000 miles at a rate of twelve knots an hour without replenishing their supply of coal.

Now, considering the question from an Australasian point of view, the security against attack of certain ports in Australasia is an essential part of the maritime defence of this portion of the empire, and it will be seen that there are some which are of common interest to all these colonies. For instance, looking at the chart of the world before you, you will observe that all ships approaching Australia by the Cape or Red Sea routes must pass comparatively near to King George's Sound. If, therefore, this harbour were held by an enemy, his war-ships acting therefrom might cut off our steamers and merchant-vessels. On the other hand, if secured to us, our men-of-war cruisers could use that port as a base for the defence of our commercial marine. Again, you will see that the Derwent, on which is the Town of Hobart, occupies a central position, whence attacks might be directed against Australia and

New Zealand. The defence of an anchorage in Torres Straits, and of a harbour in the Fiji Islands, is also of common interest, both to this colony and to the Eastern Australian Colonies. Again, New Zealand is, as it were, an advanced shield to the south-eastern part of Australia, and this is the more important in view of the probability of canal communication being opened by the Isthmus of Panama. The harbours to the northward, the southward, and the centre of this colony are advantageously situated as centres for the naval defence of Australasia. If unprotected, however, they become bases for attack upon Tasmania, Victoria, or New South Wales.

The defence of these harbours is therefore not only of importance to the places themselves and to the colony to which they belong, but has a considerable bearing upon the defence of Australasia generally. There is, perhaps, no harbour in Australasia more suitable as a centre for naval defence than Auckland.

It will then be readily understood that it is most desirable that all the Australasian Colonies should unite to carry out defences in which all are interested, making an arrangement by which each would bear its fair share of the expense. Each colony in Australia is now engaged in carrying out a plan for its own protection; but there are matters relating to the general defence of the whole of Australasia which would be best dealt with by combined action. Unity of organization, and especially measures required for general naval protection which are common to the whole of these colonies, can only be carried out under federal arrangement. So far as defence is concerned, New Zealand is probably more interested than any other Australasian Colony in the question of federation.

In the absence, however, of any such organization, each colony must do what is necessary for its own defence, taking care at the same time that, as far as possible, its separate action shall harmonize with any future joint concert with its neighbours which may arise in the course of events.

With respect to the nature of attack to which these colonies are liable in the event of Great Britain being at war with a foreign naval Power, I have often pointed out, on previous occasions, elsewhere, that there is no probability of an expedition on any extensive scale being despatched against Australia. In the improbable event of Great Britain ceasing to hold the command of the seas, such an expedition might perhaps be undertaken with a view of subjugating the colonies and finally annexing them. The very existence of the British Empire, however, depends upon her naval supremacy, and the question must obviously be considered on

the assumption that that supremacy is, as it undoubtedly will be, maintained.

In the event of Great Britain being engaged in hostilities with any great maritime Power, the enemy would retain the most powerful portion of his fleet in European waters, or in the Atlantic, for the protection of his country, or for operations in the immediate neigh-bourhood of hostilities. If he sent his fleet, or any considerable portion of it, on an expedition against the Australasian Colonies, a sufficient part of our Home fleet would in turn be set free to intercept it; and our squadrons in the Pacific, on the China, the Australasian, and Indian stations, might, if necessary, be concentrated to oppose it.

But, whilst the bulk of the enemy's naval forces would be occupied in the immediate scene of action in Europe or America, he might no doubt despatch one or more cruisers, and possibly an ironclad, to operate against our maritime commerce, or make a descent upon Australasian ports, which, if undefended or insufficiently protected, would offer tempting objects of attack. Eluding our cruisers, and appearing suddenly on the coast of New Zealand or Australia, the enemy might capture the merchant-vessels in the harbours; or—under threat of bombardment, or after actually firing into one of the towns—demand and obtain payment of money. Or this object might be attained by an enemy landing a small force in the vicinity of a town, if steps were not taken to meet such a contingency.

Of late years the Governments of the several Australian Colonies (I do not include Western Australia) have incurred considerable expenditure in providing defences for their principal ports. In 1877, accompanied by Colonel (now Major-General) Scratchley, at the request of the several Governments concerned, I visited all these colonies, and proposed measures for the defence of Port Phillip, Port Jackson, Newcastle, Brisbane, Port Adelaide, Hobart, and other places. I am glad to say that—thanks to the zeal and energy of Major-General Scratchley, who was charged with the carrying-out of the works—the recommendations made by me are now far advanced towards completion.

At Port Phillip batteries have been constructed and armed for the defence of the entrance and the West Channel, and a torpedo establishment has been provided with a view to applying torpedo defences in suitable positions in the channels within “the heads.”

A design for an important marine fort, which forms part of the system of defence—with reference to which, accompanied by Major Cautley, I reeently held a meeting at Melbourne with all the authori-

ties concerned—has been prepared, but awaits a final settlement of the details before it is carried into effect. As regards floating defences, Victoria possesses the “Cerberus,” a two-turreted ironclad monitor; the frigate “Nelson;” two fine gunboats; and three torpedo-vessels—one, the “Childers,” a specially powerful craft. Guns will also be mounted in vessels belonging to the Harbour Department of Melbourne.

At Port Jackson forts and batteries have been constructed and armed, and a casemated battery, with iron shields, is now in course of completion. Torpedo defences have also been provided there. In connection with the defence of Sydney a fort has also been erected at Botany Bay. The defence of the important coaling station at Newcastle has been provided for by a fort and by torpedoes. The Government of New South Wales also possesses the “Wolverene,” as a man-of-war training-ship, besides torpedo-vessels.

South Australia has provided a fine vessel of war—the “Protector”—for the defence of her sea-board, in addition to land batteries at Port Adelaide.

The Government of Queensland has constructed a work to command the approach to Brisbane, besides providing two gunboats and two torpedo-vessels, which will soon leave England for that colony.

In Tasmania, batteries and torpedoes, besides a torpedo-vessel, have been provided for the defence of Hobart.

In the Australian Colonies, moreover, military and naval forces have been organized or are in course of organization, and the services of officers of the Imperial Navy and Army have been obtained as desired by respective Governments.

Now, it will be observed that, in proportion as Australia is defended and New Zealand is left defenceless, this colony is all the more open to attack. Moreover, owing to the position—to which I have before referred—that New Zealand occupies as an advanced shield to the principal parts of Australia, an enemy coming from the eastward would most probably first direct his attack upon her. Scarcely any steps have been taken however for placing this colony in a state to resist external aggression.

Four torpedo-vessels have been recently provided, and a few years ago some guns with ammunition and other appliances were ordered by the Government of the day, but as yet no arrangements have been made for placing them in position at the several ports for the protection of which they were intended.

Before these armaments could be properly turned to account, it was necessary that definite plans should be prepared of the works

required for the defence of these harbours, and, with this object, the services of an Imperial officer—Major Cautley, R.E.—have been placed at the disposal of the Government.

The question of the defence of New Zealand has been ably reported upon by Major-General Scratchley, but, his visit to the colony being necessarily brief, he was unable to undertake the supervision of the designs of works necessary for the object, and no sufficient idea of the probable cost of them was at the time entertained.

Of all parts of Australasia, New Zealand, owing to her extensive seaboard and numerous harbours, is most in need of local naval protection. The principle on which the defence of the colony must be based is, that whilst the general protection of its commerce and seaboard is provided for by naval means, the chief cities and ports should be rendered secure in themselves by land batteries, submarine mines, and other local defences. By fortifying these places, the chief centres of wealth are absolutely protected, whilst each becomes a focus of refuge or action for the general naval defence.

The main general plan should therefore be to fortify Auckland Harbour, Port Nicholson, Port Lyttelton, Port Chalmers, and the Bluff Harbour; thus setting free the Imperial cruizers and any local naval force we may possess, and thereby greatly strengthening our power of general maritime defence. In fact, the fortification of these five ports is part and parcel of the naval defence of the colony.

It is obviously impossible, however, to fortify all the harbours of New Zealand. There are in this colony what I may call clusters of ports, at the north, the centre, and the south, which are capable of sheltering large ships, but at which there is only a small, in some cases no, population. In the north, besides Auckland, there are other fine harbours in Hauraki Gulf, viz., Kawau Harbour, Tamaki Strait, Coromandel Harbour; and, in the Great Barrier Island, Port Fitzroy and Port Abercromby. Again, to the northward of these, are Whangarei Harbour and the Bay of Islands (in both of which there are coal mines), Whangaroa Harbour, and Doubtless Bay. In the centre, besides Wellington, are Queen Charlotte's Sound, Nelson, Picton, and other ports and anchorages. To the southward of the Bluff Harbour there are, in Stewart Island, the grand harbours of Patterson's Inlet and Port Pegasus. At this part of the colony, moreover, to the south-west of the Middle Island, there are the numerous harbours at the Sounds.

The protection of all these, as also that of Napier, New Plymouth, Timaru, Oamaru, Hokitika, Greymouth, Westport, and other comparatively minor places, must be provided for by local naval forces acting as auxiliaries to Her Majesty's cruisers, and combined as far

as practicable with other means of defence. At or near most of the places last named, field forces of riflemen and field guns would also be available for their protection.

Before referring to the plans for the security of the principal places of New Zealand, I will make some general remarks respecting guns and submarine mines, and the mode in which they should be applied.

I wish for a moment to draw your attention to the enormous increase which has taken place during the last twenty-five or thirty years in the size and power of guns.

When I first had to deal with fortification works, in 1852, and for several years afterwards, the most powerful piece of artillery was the smooth-bore 68-pounder. Now we have guns of 100 tons weight. In the large diagram before you, you see the 68-pounder shown inside the 100-ton muzzle-loading gun. The length of the 68-pounder is 10ft., whilst that of the 100-ton gun is 32ft. 6in. Here is a model of the 68lb. shot and of the cartridge for that gun; there is a model of the missile and charge for the 100-ton gun. The missile is 2,000lb. in weight, the charge is 550lb. of gunpowder, i.e., five barrels and a half, and the two together measure about 10ft. in length! I may mention that some of these 100-ton guns are actually mounted at Gibraltar and Malta. In the more recent manufacture of powerful guns, however, breech-loading has been adopted, and the calibre reduced, whilst the length of the piece is increased, in order to provide the required capacity for the expansion of the gases of the very large charges used, which consist of very slow-burning powder. There are guns now in existence on this principle of 70 to 75 tons weight, which are superior in power to the 100-ton gun to which I have just referred.

It is scarcely necessary for me to say that I do not suggest that such enormous guns as those to which I have just referred shall be employed in the defences of New Zealand. Ships carrying armour of a thickness which these pieces are intended to pierce are not likely to find their way to Australasia.

The Government of New Zealand, in 1878, acting on the advice of a Committee assembled in London to consider questions relating to the defences of the colonies, procured from England a number of 7-inch and 64-pounder muzzle-loading rifled guns. These will form a considerable portion of the armament of the proposed works.

The 64-pounder is not an armour-piercing piece, though effective against vessels unprotected with iron plating; but the 7-inch gun is calculated to pierce 7 inches of iron at 1,000 yards, and 6 inches at

2,000 yards. It is, however, desirable that a few pieces of greater power should also be mounted on the batteries. I therefore consider that a few of the latest type of 8-inch breech-loading guns shall form part of the armament. These will pierce 7 inches of iron at 3,000 yards.

The question of the power of gun required in the defensive batteries of course depends upon the description of vessels by which these colonies may be attacked. All authorities agree that ships of war, of some sort, may make a descent upon Australasia, but a difference of opinion sometimes arises as to whether a hostile iron-clad is likely to appear in these waters. Though I believe that the class of vessel by which we are most likely to be attacked is a swift ship, of great coal-carrying power, such as I will hereafter describe, it appears to me that, in determining on our plans, it would be unwise to act on the assumption that vessels protected by iron-plates, in greater or less degree, may not be employed in the attack.

As regards the designs of the works for the reception of the guns already in the colony, as the carriages and platforms supplied for them are arranged for batteries “en barbette” (see Plate IV.), i.e., guns with a wide sweep firing over a parapet, that system will, as a rule, be adopted. The only exception to this will be in a case, to which I shall hereafter refer, where it will be necessary to place the guns in casemates in order to protect them from fire from heights in their rear.

With respect to the guns not yet provided, it is proposed that they shall be mounted on “disappearing” carriages by means of which—excepting at the time of actual firing, when the gun and one man only is exposed—both gun and gunners are absolutely protected from an enemy's fire.

I pass on to consider the use of submarine mines, which should, when practicable, be employed in the defence of harbours, in order to stop an enemy's ships and detain them under the fire of the batteries. I am glad to find that Admiral Scott, of Dunedin, so well known at the Admiralty for the great improvements which he effected in regard to ships' gun-carriages, is specially advocating the adoption of this element of defence.

Twenty years ago there was very little method in employing these engines of war, but now the application of them has become quite a complicated science.

They may be divided into three classes, viz., mechanical mines, observation mines, and electro-contact mines.

Locomotive torpedoes are submarine weapons which possess within themselves the power of locomotion. Of these I will specially notice the Whitehead torpedo, the Lay torpedo, and the Brennan torpedo.

The Whitehead or “fish” torpedo is an uncontrollable weapon, i.e., after it is projected from the bow or side of a vessel it cannot be controlled or directed by the will of an operator. It is made of various sizes, ranging from 14ft. long and 14in. maximum diameter, to 19ft. long by 16in. maximum diameter. The larger size carries a charge of 80lb. of gun-cotton at its bow. Its motive-power is compressed air, which, by means of small engines, drives two screw propellers. It is capable of being adjusted, by means of certain mechanical apparatus, to a certain depth, and when launched will go at a rate of about twenty-five knots an hour or more for several hundred yards.

Properly to use the Whitehead torpedo, however, an expert's knowledge of the weapon and special training is required. In words used by Admiral Boys, once Naval Director of Ordnance, to make it a success you must “love it.” It has only been tried as yet—so far as I am aware—on three occasions in actual warfare, but on one of these it was perfectly successful. This was in 1878, when a Russian steamer fired a Whitehead torpedo against a Turkish vessel off Batoum and destroyed her.

I may mention that the Governments of Austria and Great Britain each gave Mr. Whitehead something like £20,000 for the use of his torpedo, and that nearly all the other European Governments have since purchased the secret. The Turks, however, picked up two of these torpedoes, which they found on the shore after having been unsuccessfully fired at their ships, and so obtained the use of the weapon without paying for it.

The Lay torpedo and the Brennan torpedo are shaped something like the Whitehead; and, like that weapon, are provided with charges at the bow end, which explode on contact. Unlike the Whitehead, however, they are not intended to be discharged as missiles, but are controllable whilst in motion.

The Lay torpedo, an American invention, about 25ft. long, with a maximum diameter of 24in., is a sort of torpedo-boat propelled by screws worked by machinery, the motor of which is carbonic-acid gas. It is controlled by an operator on shore or ship by an electric cable attached to it, and has an apparatus within it by means of which a rudder at the stern can be moved to port or starboard as desired. Upon it are two guide rods by which it is directed, and which can be raised or lowered at will. Each of these is pro-

vided with a disc for day and with a small oil-lamp for night. It is claimed for this torpedo that it is controllable to a distance of upwards of 2,500 yards. I understand that the Russian Government possess several of these weapons. Different accounts, however, are given as to the performances of this torpedo, and further information about it is required before it can be pronounced a success.

The Brennan torpedo, called after the inventor, Mr. Brennan, of Melbourne, appears to be a much simpler weapon. It is about 20ft. long with a maximum diameter of about 20in. In the body of the torpedo are placed two drums round which is wound a fine wire, and the drums are connected with the shaft of the screw propellers attached to the stern. On the wire on the drums inside the torpedo being unwound, the screw-shaft revolves and the torpedo moves ahead. Steering is effected by increasing or decreasing the velocity with which the wire on either drum is unwound. There is an apparatus within the torpedo by means of which it assumes and retains the level below water at which it is required to move. The arrangement for guiding the weapon is somewhat similar in principle to that used in the Lay. In this case, however, there is only one rod and disc attached to the top of the torpedo, which is painted red on the side towards the operator. When used at night, a funnel, which appears above water, and emits luminous chemical fumes, takes the place of the painted disc. The trials of this torpedo in the River Medway, in 1882, showed that it was effective at a range of 2,000 yards, and were deemed so successful that the Imperial Government bought the patent of it.

I now wish to draw your attention to torpedo-vessels, which are now regarded by naval nations as of great importance in maritime warfare.

Steam-launches, or other craft not specially constructed for the purpose, may be fitted with outrigger-spars, at the end of which torpedoes may be placed, and directed against the side of an enemy's ship. Speed, however, being a great element in the success of torpedo-vessels, they are now constructed so as to steam with great rapidity, and to carry Whitehead torpedoes, which, as I have already stated, may be propelled against a ship at a distance of several hundred yards. As you are no doubt aware, some of these vessels of the second class have lately been provided, on the recommendation of Major-General Scratchley, to take part in the defence of your principal ports. These measure 63ft. long with a beam of 7ft. 6in., will go about seventeen knots per hour, and one of them has been fitted with gear for the Whitehead torpedo.

Torpedo-boats have, however, been constructed of much greater size and speed, and with sea-going qualities.

About four years ago one was built for the Russian Government of larger dimensions than any that had been constructed before, it being desired that she should be a sort of torpedo-cruiser, capable of going to sea in rough weather, and have coal-carrying capacity sufficient to make a run at a moderate speed of at least eight hundred miles. This vessel, called the “Batoum,” is represented by the photograph herewith. She is 100ft. in length by 12ft. beam, and adapted for carrying four Whitehead torpedoes. To take her to her destination three short masts and sails were temporarily fitted to her as a precautionary measure in case the machinery broke down or the coal-supply ran short. She left England in August, 1880, having a crew on board of three officers and nine men, and steamed from London to Nicolaieff, exclusive of stoppages, in eighteen days, the distance run being 4,800 miles, including calling at Fiume on the way —being an average speed of eleven knots an hour. On trial a speed of twenty-two knots was actually obtained from her.

This vessel, which was the first torpedo-boat that made a successful voyage of any duration, has been considered by many Governments to be worthy of reproduction; for, soon after its construction, the Argentine, Greek, Brazilian, Austrian, Dutch, and Italian Governments ordered similar vessels. In fact, the “Batoum” may be said to have given rise to an altogether new type of sea-going torpedo-cruiser.

The Victorian Government have already in their possession a vessel of this class, but somewhat superior, named the “Childers.” Her cost was £10,500. She is 113ft. 6in. long, with a beam of 12ft. 6in., and was brought out to Port Phillip by sea, just as the “Batoum” was from London to Nicolaieff. In order to render these vessels effective for the defence of the harbours of New Zealand, it would be necessary to have a considerable number of them, and it would be essential that they should be manned by crews specially trained for their service.

(I will for a moment ask you to look at the photographs herewith of some torpedo-vessels belonging to the English, Russian, Italian, Greek, Argentine, and other Governments.)

I have referred to locomotive torpedoes and torpedo-vessels, because these are the means by which, it is urged by some, that the defence of ports which cannot be otherwise specially protected may be provided. I confess, however, that though it appears to me probable that the Brennan torpedo may be turned to account for the defence of New Zealand harbours, I do not see my way at present to advise the adoption of other locomotive torpedoes, or to suggest that

outlay should now be incurred in the direction of providing more torpedo-vessels.

Nor—though I should be glad to see a man-of-war provided as a nucleus for other naval forces—can I advise that the recommendations made by some of my naval friends for the purchase and maintenance by the colony of a considerable number of war-cruisers, gun-vessels, and torpedo-boats should be acted on.

In the distant future New Zealand may become—I venture to foretell she will become—a considerable Naval Power; but meanwhile she must be content with what her present resources will enable her to accomplish. The most practical suggestion that I can now make with regard to the provision by the colony of vessels of war is to make arrangements for utilizing certain vessels of the Union Steamship Company as auxiliary cruisers for local defence.

More than a year ago I wrote to the authorities in England to consult them on this subject, and I find that five of these ships, viz., the “Rotomahana,” the “Tarawera,” the “Waihora,” the “Hauroto,” and the “Rotorua” can easily, by additional bulkheads or water-tight subdivisions, be rendered capable of complying with the conditions as to flotation necessary to qualify them for use as armed cruisers. Coal-bunkers can also be arranged in them so as to provide protection to the machinery against shot and shell-fire, it having been found by experiment that coal will afford a measure of such protection.

In like manner the “Aorangi,” “Ruapehu,” and “Tongariro,” belonging to the New Zealand Shipping Company, and two ships of the Shaw, Savill, and Albion Company would be available as armed cruisers.

The diagram before you shows a vessel somewhat of the character of the five last-mentioned, fitted with armament, coal protection, and other details necessary to constitute her a war-cruiser. The ships of the Union Steamship Company would be similarly treated, on a scale suitable to their dimensions.

Probably, in case of war, the armaments, stores, and fitments required for the direct steamship lines would be put on board in England. As regards the vessels of the Union Steamship Company, however, I would recommend that everything necessary to be placed in them in order to constitute them auxiliary cruisers, including armament of breach-loading guns and machine guns, should be kept in store at one of the principal ports of New Zealand, ready to be put on board whenever war appeared imminent. I suggest also that arrangements be made with the Union Steamship Company for fitting the vessels I have named with the additional bulkheads necessary to give them the requisite degree of flotation and other fitments for war-vessels.

I shall be happy to supply, or to obtain if I cannot supply, any information that may be required with a view of carrying out this proposal.

It is obvious that the several measures which I have recommended will be of no avail without efficient land and sea forces. If the works for the defence of the principal ports are to fulfil their purpose, the batteries must be well manned and there must be proper garrisons for them. The discipline of the field-forces and of the forces generally, and their ability to act against an enemy, can only be acquired by proper and sufficient training. Officers commanding at each place should have a clear view as to what they would have to do in case of attack. For the handling of vessels of war and the working of their armaments, amongst other requirements, a knowledge of gunnery is essential. Again, the application of torpedoes requires skill, which can only be obtained by men who give special attention to that department of defence.

Major-General Scratchley entered into the subject of the organization of the forces in much detail, and since his visit, though not according to his suggestions, some action was taken in the matter. Generally speaking, however, the whole arrangement of the military and naval forces of the colony should be gone into with reference to the duties which each section would have to perform in case of war, and the organization which is necessary to resist foreign aggression should harmonize with that which is essential for internal defence. I may remark that this would be much facilitated by the completion of railway communication throughout the North Island.

I have not time now, and, if I had, it would be out of place for me to discuss the details of these matters. I may, however, say that it appears to me that one of the first steps to be taken here should be to obtain the services of an officer of the army as commandant, with a staff-officer under him, to manage matters relating to the land forces. Of these, one should be a Royal Artilleryman. An officer of the Navy should also be appointed to deal with naval organization and naval questions generally; and, if no better arrangement can be made, it is desirable that he should be selected with a view to his taking charge of business relating to submarine mines and locomotive torpedoes. There is abundance of military and naval spirit in this country, but efficient organization is essential, in order that it may be turned to the best account.

To recapitulate. I recommend that the principal—cities and ports of New Zealand shall be defended by land batteries and submarine

mines, where applicable; that arrangements be made for utilizing for purposes of war the fine merchant-steamers which are capable of being so turned to account; and that the land and naval forces of the colony be reorganized, so as to fit them for the duties they would have to perform if called upon for actual service.

It may, however—and not unreasonably—be inquired, “But how much will all this cost?” Well, not so large a sum as many suppose. The whole thing could be done for a capital sum of £400,000. Of course, there would also be some annual expenditure, in addition to that at present incurred, for maintenance, for ammunition and stores, and for the pay of officers and men. I cannot now say what this would amount to, but it would not be large.

Now, I venture to think that, considering the interests at stake, the capital sum I have named is a moderate price to pay for the benefit it will purchase. Not to mention the amount of the local commerce of the colony, the value of the cities to be defended is probably about thirty millions sterling. The loss which would be occasioned by one attack would far exceed the outlay which would have prevented it; and the degradation to which it would subject the country is beyond my power to estimate.

New Zealand, however, at present expends scarcely anything for the purpose of resisting foreign aggression, whilst that of other States, whose revenue, and imports and exports combined, are about the same as hers, is very considerable. For instance, in 1882 the naval expenditure alone of the Argentine Republic was upwards of £120,000; that of Chili, £244,000 (peace expenditure); that of Greece, with a revenue of about £1,600,000 and : a commerce of less than seven millions sterling, was £133,000. I know that the circumstances of these States are, in many respects, different from those of New Zealand, and I do not advocate that she should enter into competition with them. I do, however, venture to suggest that she should not rest content in her present unprotected condition. It is not only impolitic, but rash, for her to remain in a passive, defence-less state, unprepared to resist aggression, trusting to the forbearance of any Power possessing the means of attack.

The necessary measures should be taken gradually and deliberately, and should not be deferred for spasmodic action, at a time of panic, when steps would be hurriedly taken, which would surely lead to useless expenditure, and would, moreover, not effect their object. New Zealand is no longer in her infancy, but in the full vigour of youth, and I am sure that her people—vital as the question is to them—are prepared to incur the burden and the responsibility of their defence.