
II.
Returning now to the cultural dynamics of social change, the first point to note is the fact that cultures as a whole display a differential reaction to social change itself. Kroeber, for instance, has reminded us of the existence of labile social structures—among primitives, of impermanence and instabilities in social structure, among lettered peoples, in political forms. Among those groups in which this “play-derived, though unconscious activity of culture” operates we may expect, other things being equal, a hospitality to social change which would be unlikely in other more conservative and in-drawn cultures. Again, Kroeber would consider that cultures can suffer from “cultural fatigue”—a kind of social staleness and disillusion which results in widespread social exasperation. As Kroeber remarks, “Once an attitude of the kind develops sufficient strength, novelty as such may come to seem a virtue and a boon.”
Finally, we may note an aspect of cultural change which Kroeber discusses in terms of affective anchoring, but which has been rephrased and reformulated lately in the terms of relative congruence of values between two cultures in contact. According to Kroeber, certain customs in a culture become loaded with emotion—stepdaughter marriage and disposal of dead bodies are his two examples. If emotionally weighted customs are in addition part of largerorganised systems of ideas and sentiments, then the affect becomes a factor making for stability and resistance to change. If, on the other hand, the custom is only loosely connected, then it may change, but since the free-floating emotion endures and looks for attachment, the change will be one of substitution. Thus in either case, affect operates as a stabilizing, conservative force (though Krober would not agree that substitution is eventually conservatism).
In the newer reformulation, it becomes more appropriate to assume that not customs or traits alone are invested with emotion, but that whole areas or aspects of a given culture are permeated with positive valences. These valences express the system of value-judgments of a culture. At the personal level they are part of the basic personality structure of typical individuals in the culture. At the cultural level they represent one of the unique ways in which a given culture combines its customs or traits into a meaningful whole. Where there is a greater rather than a less amount of congruence between the value systems of two cultures in contact there is a greater chance that one culture (subordinate through the operation of various other factors) will

borrow from the superior culture and work over the borrowings into its own unique pattern. In this particular contact situation, this particular subordinate culture will be socially labile and thus change with a minimum amount of personal or social stress. Recent work in Micronesia, for instance, appears to suggest that congruence between the values of Palauan society and those of American society is one good reason why Palau is readily adjusting to new introduced forms of social and economic organisation. Where this congruence does not exist (for instance among many Pueblo peoples in the American South-west) social change does not take place so quickly.
One immediate conclusion therefore is this: evaluation of social change and its probable speed must depend upon the social scientists' prior knowledge of the relative ability of the receiving culture, the value system of this culture and the relationship between these two variables and the pressures and values of the giving culture.
It is by now a fairly well established fact that social change is most likely to be initiated when there are disaffected persons in the receiving culture who are likely to gain material, social or spiritual advantage through a new social order to be brought, about by changed social statuses. Similarly, the followers are likely to be those whose status position in the “primitive” culture is most precarious. “Disaffected” is a wide category and obviously includes all those who for one reason or another are misfits, know it, and hope for improved adjustment: the losers in war, the losers in a status struggle, the ego-defeated in religion, politics, economics or family affairs. Another approach to the evaluation of social change therefore is prior knowledge of the number, status and kind of adult misfits in the recipient culture, and the kinds of tension which heir presence in the receiving culture is generating at the time new ways of life are presented to the people concerned. Temporary or permanent leaders are likely to come from the misfits—though the misfits are not necessarily found among the economic “have-nots” in a given society.
The speed at which change, once initiated, is likely to continue, must depend, among other variables, upon the speed at which individual personality organisation can also change in order to support the new social organisation and institutions generated by the process of change. The relation between personality and culture is complex. Culture helps to build the personality structure, which in turn supports or changes the culture. A changing culture will have effects on personality more difficult to analyse or predict than a stable culture, though much depends upon whether culture changes are static (or peripheral) or dynamic (or core-influencing). Study of some examples of culture change (for instance in the Cook Islands, among the Iroquois and among the Salteaux) appears to suggest that culture change may progress considerably without altering basic personality structure. In those instances it is probable that personality “lag” or inertia acts as a resistance to the speed of social change, slowing it down or skewing it in directions which harmonise with the personality lag, or, at least, cause the least amount of intra-psychic tension. This hypothesis would offer an explanation for both the backward-looking world-view of the Dakota Sioux, the apparent inability of some Maori groups to succeed in dairy farming, or the resistance to some types of social change among the Iroquois and the Salteaux.
The conclusion arrived at therefore, in connection with the problem of evaluation is that personality tests, including protective tests, may very well

be used to study personality structure among a people undergoing social change; and that the results of such testing need to be considered in evaluating the probable results of induced social change.
One important aspect of the personality structure is the organisation of motives, the types of incentives to which a person has learned to respond, and the sorts of authority that he finds most congenial. Incentives and authority relationships are part of the cultural matrix. Motives are the personality correspondences to the cultural patterns or, better, personality variations on a theme set by culture. One of the problems of social change, particularly of change in the technological organisation of a society, is to develop in persons the type of motivational structure that will allow a new technology to operate to its optimum extent. Attitudes to time are important here, attitudes to continuous, uninterrupted, segmental work, attitudes to fine finger-dexterity work as compared with hard muscle-slogging work, attitudes to routine as compared with individually determined quantity and tempo of work. Equally basic is the incentive that is offered for making a new adjustment in the attitude system, and what becomes of the monetary or other reward once it is earned.
As something of an aside, it might he well to note here that German and Russian industrialists in the nineteenth century, according to Gerschenkron, were in the habit of inveighing against the inability of their workers to adjust to the developing industrial system, comparing these unreliable workers, much to their disadvantage, with the reliable industrious English worker. Evidently even in Europe it took time to turn a peasant into a factory hand. The work habits of the modem European workers are thus not a God-given inborn superiority of the European over his African or Mexican fellow-worker.
The only methods we can use to measure socio-technical change are simple records of output, absentecism, labour turnover and the like. It may be well to keep in mind, however, the fact noted by Moore that it is the least acculturated Mexican Indians who flock into factory work, and who therefore adjust to it more easily than more acculturated Indians. The reason why is not clear, theoretically or practically. It is possible that the “primitive” value-systems of some Indian groups are more compatible with the value-systems implicit in technology than those Indian value-systems already disintegrating under other types of social change pressure. Or perhaps other variables are operating to make technological adjustment easier: for instance, workers and their families migrating to a centre of industry where they join a social group already in existence and composed of workers and their families from the same village or tribe—this is one inference to be drawn from Lewis's study of the city adjustment of Tepotzlan workers. and again from the fact that Peruvian Highland Indians work well seasonally in the lowland industries, plantations and factories if there are already existing social clubs composed of men from their own village or neighbourhood. to which they can belong and where they can find some acceptable social satisfactions.
New authority relationships brought about by social change may or may not be congenial to the implicit preferred authority pattern of the peasant worker. Where it is not so suited, personal adjustment will be achieved only slowly and institutional change subject to many frictions. Father Charles' study of the Bantu conception of a contractual obligation and of his tendency to respond to his European employer as if he were his tribal chief is illuminat-

ing. So long as both Bantu and European are unaware of the fact that their respective conceptions of the labour situation, and consequently their perception of worker and boss, are totally different, indeed contradictory, then industrial friction is inevitable, employer frustration probable and workers' feeling of injustice an ever-present factor in industrial unrest.
The social scientist therefore can help to evaluate the role of implicit authority relationships and their effects on social change. In New Zealand we might begin with a study of what authority in family and tribe means to the Maori, how authority relationships are perceived, and how far these relationships coincide or are at variance with a European foreman or employer's implicit conception of this relationship for both his European and his Maori workers. Perhaps the study should be extended to include the authority relations of the trade-union secretary and the manner in which these relations mesh or grind in the gears of an industrial system.
